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Abstract 
 
Venture capital is a potent source of R&D financing which contributes significantly to technological 
innovation output in the form of patented inventions. Scholars have argued that tighter protection of 
intellectual property rights reduces expropriation risks and encourages venture capitalists to invest in 
technology firms. Prior studies have showed that early stage technology investors give much weight 
to investment selection criteria related to innovation e.g. protection of intellectual property, platform 
and uniqueness. However, VC investors generally receive little on their investments until a 
liquidation event occurs – IPO and M&A (trade sale) exits define venture capital performance.  
 
A review of the literature indicates that few empirical studies have examined the influence of 
patented innovation on the exit performance of VC-backed technology firms. This paper seeks to 
address this specific knowledge gap in venture capital research and practice. It builds on resource-
based view (RBV) theory which argues that technological innovation is an important strategic 
resource of the entrepreneurial firm that can attract VC investment, provide competitive advantage 
and produce superior performance. 
 
This study is based on matched data compiled from VentureXpertTM, DelphionTM and NBER/USPTO 
databases. The resulting unique and proprietary dataset consists of 1504 U.S. VC-backed exits across 
7 technology sectors in the 20 years from 1980-2000, 961 IPOs and 543 M&As. The influence of 
technological innovation on the exit performance of VC-backed technology firms is examined. As 
predicted by RBV theory, technology firms engaged in patenting activity were found more likely to 
be associated with the more profitable IPO exit route, higher VC investment and exit value.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent times the subject of innovation has drawn significant interest amongst economists, policy 
makers and academia. The interest stems from the Schumpeterian belief that technological 
competition is the major form of competition under capitalism. Innovation is crucial for long-term 
economic growth and a powerful explanatory factor behind differences in performance between 
firms, regions and countries. Studies after studies have shown that firms that succeed in innovation 
prosper, at the expense of their less able competitors (EIU, 2007). R&D is considered a key source 
for sustaining economic growth and welfare and countries have set long-term targets for their R&D 
intensities. In particular, expansion of new firms in high-technology sectors has become essential in 
many advanced economies and it is therefore of utmost importance to ensure that the right conditions 
exist for “new technology-based firms” to flourish. Major differences, however, still persist. For 
example, early-stage venture capital investment (at 0.06% of GNP) is at a level in the US that is 60% 
higher than in the EU (EC DG Research, 2007). Consequently, the economic impact of venture 
capital (VC) on the U.S. economy is more significant. Global Insight (2007) estimated total revenue 
of some 24,000 U.S. venture-backed companies to be $2.3 trillion (17.6% of U.S. GDP) and total 
employment to be 10.4 million (9.1% of U.S. private sector employment). Economic necessity has 
become the mother of innovation.  
Innovation is rightly considered a critical driver of economic growth and value creation, and venture 
capital an important channel through which innovation in technology venture firms is financed. 
Moreover, in developed finance and knowledge-based economies the evolution of the enterprise and 
its capacity to innovate depend on the limits defined by finance (Laperche et al, 2008). The 
relationship between innovation and finance is also coloured with some level of controversy. Whilst 
some authors asserted that venture capital spurs innovation (Kortum and Lerner, 2000) others 
claimed that venture capital actually thwarts innovation (Stuck and Weingarten, 2005). There is little 
doubt that the relationship between venture innovation and finance is an exciting field of study for 
researchers who wish to pay attention to it.  
In particular, exiting, the final stage of the VC investment process is a most critical component of 
venture capital investment performance as VC-backed firms rarely produce positive cash flows for 
investors until a liquidity event occurs. From the investor’s perspective, liquidity events (“exits”) are 
only measure of performance in venture capital investing and IPOs and M&As are the most common 
form of venture capital exits. Going public (via an Initial Public Offering, IPO) and private sale of the 
venture to another firm (i.e. Merger and Acquisition, M&A) are, by far, the most common exit routes 
in the U.S. Thus in this study, technological innovation, with filed patents used as proxy, is examined 
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to determine whether it influences the exit performance of VC-backed technology firms which exited 
via an IPO or an M&A.  
Sector-specific studies have been limited to showing a relationship between patenting and (i) the total 
venture capital invested in technology firms (Baum and Silverman, 2004; Mann and Sager, 2007) and 
(ii) the likelihood of an IPO (Hsu and Ziedonis, 2007). However, there is no known large-scale 
empirical panel study, across multiple technology sectors, of the influence of patenting activity on 
venture capital exit performance. This is an important topic and scholars have rightly stressed how 
very little attention the exiting of venture capital investments has attracted Gompers and Lerner 
(2004, p.350). Moreover, O’Sullivan (2006) noted the lack of integration between the fields of 
finance and innovation as evidenced by the absence of empirical studies in this area. Zingales (2000) 
was also explicit in his call for “new foundations”, in particular a more sophisticated analysis of the 
firm, for the study of corporate finance (“the way firms are financed”). With the rise of an economy 
increasingly driven by intellectual capital (Grandstrand, 1999) traditional corporate finance theory 
has revealed serious limitations. Zingales stated: 
 
“Understanding the factors underlying a firm’s ability to exploit growth opportunities will 
not only affect the way we value firms but also create a fundamental building block toward 
a theory of entrepreneurship.” 
This empirical study seeks to address this specific knowledge gap in venture capital research and 
practice.  It is based on matched data compiled from VentureXpertTM (venture data), DelphionTM and 
NBER/USPTO (patent data) databases. The resulting unique and proprietary dataset consists of 1504 
U.S. VC-backed exits across 7 technology sectors, 961 IPOs and 543 M&As, which collectively filed 
4,261 patents in the 20 years from 1980-2000. 
Mean total VC investment, exit value and exit multiple over the study period were $22.0 million, 
$145 million and 21x, respectively. Mean total VC investment, exit value and exit multiple for firms 
which exited via an IPO were higher by 84%, 115% and 111% respectively, than for technology 
firms exiting via an M&A – making IPO the most attractive exit route over the study period. Results 
are consistent with prior studies (Metrick, 2007; Das, 2003). A larger percentage of venture firms 
which exited via an IPO engaged in patenting activity (52%) prior to exit than those which exited via 
an M&A (33%). The relationship holds true for all sectors but the semiconductor sector where mean 
patenting rates were not found to be significantly different between exit routes. After controlling for 
exit route, venture firms engaged in patenting activity prior to exit were still associated with a 
statistically significant increase in total VC investment and exit value. Patenting activity, however, 
had a negative influence on exit multiple. Patenting and venture capital performance indicators were 
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found to vary significantly across sectors. Combined (M&A and IPO exits) patenting rates ranged 
from a low of 20% for the internet sector to a high of 76% for the semiconductor/electronics sector. 
This empirical study builds on resource-based view (RBV) theory for explaining why patented 
innovation is associated with larger VC investment and exit value. Patented innovation is shown to be 
a critical resource of the firm which (i) helps reduce inherent selection risks associated with 
information asymmetry, can (ii) act an insurance policy by enabling VCs to recover some residual 
value in the event of a business failure and, more crucially, (iii) result in sustainable competitive 
advantage and superior performance for the new venture. The findings have important implications 
for venture capital practice as they confirm that protected inventions convey important information 
about the technology firm and its future prospects. They have and should continue to warrant 
considerable attention during the due diligence process. 
In the next two sections the theoretical framework for the study is discussed and research hypotheses 
developed. It is followed with sections on data and methodology, results and conclusion. 
2. Resources of the Firm  
The resource-based view (RBV) of the firm, suggesting that the returns earned by firms could largely 
be attributed to resources they held, find its origins more than fifty years ago (Penrose, 1959).  It 
took, however, 25 years for strategic management scholars to recognise the power of Penrose’s 
theory of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984). In his seminal paper Firm Resources and Competitive 
Advantage, Barney (1991) identified four empirical indicators of the potential of the firm resources to 
generate sustained competitive advantage – value, rareness, imitability and substitutability (VRIS). 
Moreover, Barney’s model assumes heterogeneity between resources the firm controls and that these 
resources are not perfectly mobile across firms, implying that heterogeneity can be long lasting. 
According to RBV, resources (e.g. assets, capabilities, processes, information, knowledge, etc) are 
defined as strengths firms can use to conceive strategies and sustained competitive advantage as 
something the firm has when it is implementing a unique value creating strategy not reproducible by 
current or potential competitors (in spite of their effort to do so). Whenever these conditions hold, the 
firm’s bundle of resources can assist the firm sustaining superior performance.  
Some strategy authors believe that intangible resources, because they are socially complex and more 
difficult to understand and imitate, are more likely to lead to a sustained competitive advantage than 
are tangible resources. This is an important concept as technology-based firms (TBFs) tend to be 
primarily endowed with intangible resources at an early stage. In particular, knowledge is a firm-
specific intangible resource and possibly firm’s most critical competitive resource (Grant, 1996). The 
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knowledge-based approach helps shed new light upon firm’s innovations. In the knowledge-based 
view (KBV) of the firm, the principle of appropriability (i.e. the ability of the owner of a resource to 
receive a return equal to the value created by that resource) defined earlier by Arrow (1959) is 
revisited - an issue of great concern for TBFs seeking to sustain technological innovation. Supporting 
the knowledge-based approach, Spender (1996) argued that knowledge and the firm's ability to 
generate it were at the core of the theory of the firm and provided further insights above and beyond 
RBV theories and competitive strategy theory. Accordingly, technological knowledge (that is, 
knowledge that describes the functions and interactions of natural and artificial things) can be 
individual explicit (i.e. individual skills pertaining to a particular technology that can be codified e.g. 
a patent), individual tacit (i.e. individual skills pertaining to a particular technology that is personal), 
collective explicit (e.g. standard operating procedures), or collective tacit (e.g. an organization’s 
routines and culture regarding technology). Moreover, for innovation to occur, knowledge must not 
just be shared, but also reused, recombined, and accumulated (Murray et al., 2007). Each of the 
technological knowledge dimensions can be the source of competitive advantage and value creation.  
However, in this study we investigate the evidence of superior venture capital performance resulting 
from firm’s competitive advantage gained from a specific type of knowledge i.e. explicit 
technological knowledge, which can be codified, protected and measured. The innovation literature 
drawing on resource-based view theory, and the more specific knowledge-based view theory, are 
used here to horde theoretical underpinnings for this paper. It is argued that venture firms logically 
and rationally view technological innovation as a strategic resource from which they can derive a 
sustainable competitive advantage (Porter, 1979, 1985) and produce superior performance (Arrow, 
1959; Griliches, 1981; Romer, 1986, 1990; Geroski, 1993; Granstrand, 1999). 
The approach finds much support in the strategy literature which argues that technological learning 
plays a vital role in the firm’s competitive success (Hitt et al. 2000, p.232):  
“Among the many factors that will influence the firm’s performance in the 21st century’s 
competitive landscape, globalization, technological advances and knowledge are perhaps 
the most significant.” 
 
 “To generate value, firms must be able to identify, create and continuously manage 
knowledge. Knowledge may be the most strategically significant resource the firm can 
possess and on which sustainable competitive advantages can be built. Some scholars 
believe that competition is becoming more knowledge-based and that the sources of 
competitive advantage are shifting to intellectual capabilities from physical assets.” 
 
“The increasing competitive importance of knowledge has led to the development of the 
knowledge-based view of the firm. This evolving perspective, suggesting that the primary 
rationale for the firm’s existence is to create, transfer and apply knowledge, is an extension 
of the resource-based view of the firm.” 
 
The innovation literature also proposes novel approaches for theorizing about technology-based firms by 
 7 
 
focusing on technology as part of the firm’s intellectual capital and general resources, interacting within a 
competitive environment under active and innovative management (Granstrand, 1998). The knowledge 
resource shares the general characteristics of knowledge but with additional features such as being 
protectable by patents, giving them strong economies of scale, scope, speed and space resulting in a 
greater ability for the entrepreneurial technology firm to create a sustainable competitive advantage. 
Conversely, larger industrial groups can exercise alternative strategic options to expand their technology 
knowledge base. They can use their substantial financial resources to acquire dynamic technological 
capabilities via an M&A-based corporate expansion strategy. Patent studies have shown that, in contrast 
with market-motivated acquisitions, in technology-motivated acquisitions technological relatedness 
increased in inter-industry expansions (Cantwell and Santangelo, 2008). Moreover, previous research 
highlighted the interplay between venture capital and TBFs’ innovation. Kortum and Lerner (2000) 
examined the influence of venture capital on innovation in the U.S. across twenty industries over three 
decades and found that increases in venture capital activity are associated with higher patenting rates. 
Whilst the ratio of venture capital to R&D was less than 3% authors venture capital accounted for more 
than 8% of industrial innovations during the period, implying that VC- backed firms are more likely to 
innovate and engage in patenting activity.  
We may conclude that technological innovation is, arguably, one of the most potent resources the 
entrepreneurial technology-based firm (TBF) can have to sustain long term competitive advantage 
over large established incumbents, and in doing so, produce superior performance. 
3. Financing Early Stage Technology-based Firms  
Venture capital finance, also referred to as entrepreneurial finance by academia, is a major source of 
financing for technology entrepreneurs. Its study and understanding is important as the lack of 
financial management ability has been found to be a major cause of failure amongst venture firms 
(Thornhill and Amit, 2003). Early-stage venture capital investing is a risky business, characterised by 
high failure rates. Less than 25% of those firms which get a first round of VC funding manage to exit 
via an IPO, the most profitable exit route (Metrick, 2007). Thus, the chance that an investment's 
actual return will be different than expected is high. This includes the possibility of losing some or all 
of the original investment. A fundamental idea in finance is the relationship between risk and return. 
The greater the amount of risk that an investor is willing to take on, the greater the potential return. 
The average IRR (internal rate of return) for U.S. early-stage venture capital, well in excess of 30% 
during the 10 years ending 2007, is a testimony considering that Nasdaq and S&P500 indices 
achieved less than 5% during the period3.  
                                                 
3
 Source: Thomson Financial/National Venture Capital Association. 
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The reason for this is that investors need to be compensated for taking on additional risks. Venture 
capital investment risks include technology risk, market risk, management risk, legal risk, financial 
risk and liquidity risk4. Technology venture finance differs from corporate finance in two important 
ways: 
 
I. Information Asymmetry. Differences between venture and corporate finance also arise from 
the magnitude and importance of the information problem between inside and outside 
investors. This is compounded by the fact that in venture finance outside investors are looking 
specifically to the venture project to realise a return. This is in sharp contrast with the 
corporate setting, where “selling” specific projects to investors is not necessary as each 
project are usually small relative to the value of the corporation. There is abundant literature 
about the central role VCs play in minimizing information asymmetries (Amit et al., 1998). 
The structuring of staged venture capital investments is crucial when agency and monitoring 
costs exist. Expected agency costs have been found to increase as assets become less tangible, 
growth options increase, and asset specificity rises (Gompers, 1995). Venture capitalists are 
known to concentrate investments in early stage and high technology companies where 
informational asymmetries are highest. Technology investors give more weight to innovation 
criteria such as protection of intellectual property (IP), uniqueness and platform technology 
than “people” or “financial” investors (Clarysse et al., 2004). Decreases in industry ratios of 
tangible assets to total assets (i.e. increases in intangible intellectual property), higher market-
to-book ratios, and greater R&D intensities lead to more frequent monitoring. Venture 
capitalists have been found to continuously gather information and maintain the option to 
discontinue funding projects with little probability of going public5. In practice, venture 
capital contracts which may include cash flow rights, board rights, voting rights, liquidation 
rights, and other control rights which are used by the entrepreneur and VC investors to realise 
the advantages of VC financing and mitigate agency costs and information problems (Admati 
and Pfleiderer, 1994; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003). In particular the use of convertible 
securities (e.g. convertible preferred shares) with liquidation rights has been found to 
contribute to optimal exit decisions in venture capital finance (Bascha and Walz, 2001). 
II. Exiting, the final stage of the VC investment process is a most critical component of valuation 
and evaluation in initial investment decisions. In corporate finance, investment opportunities 
                                                 
4
 Risk stemming from the lack of marketability of an investment that cannot be bought or sold quickly enough to prevent 
or minimize a loss. 
5
 Guler (2007) however found that VCs were less likely to terminate unsuccessful investments as they participate in more 
rounds of financing. 
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are evaluated based on ability to generate free positive cash flow. The free cash flow may be 
distributed to investors in the form of dividends or retained by the corporation to help finance 
other opportunities. Investing in new ventures is different. New venture investments normally 
are not liquid and often do not generate any significant free cash flow for several years. Thus, 
VCs evaluate opportunities based on the expectation of a liquidity event that will enable them 
to realise a return. Because of the importance of liquidity events, they are generally forecast 
and factored into valuation of the investment. Going public (via an Initial Public Offering, 
IPO) and private sale of the venture to another firm (i.e. Merger and Acquisition, M&A) are, 
by far, the most common exiting alternatives in the U.S. Giot and Schwienbacher (2007) 
found that IPOs and M&As represented between 84-95% of all exits depending on investment 
stage. 
From the investor’s perspective liquidity events (“exits”) are the true and only measure of 
performance in venture capital investing and IPOs and M&As are the most common form of venture 
capital exits. Thus, this paper will closely examine the relationship between innovation and the IPO 
or M&A exit of technology ventures. 
IPO and M&A Exit Options 
There are many factors which may influence the ultimate choice of exit: IPO or M&A. Financial, 
information, and timing factors as well as market conditions are most often cited in the literature as 
contributing to the exit decision. Exit choices of venture-backed firms follow a performance 
hierarchy, with top-performing companies choosing IPOs, companies opting for trade sales 
performing less well on average. At the other end of the spectrum troubled investments often result in 
delayed exits or write-offs. In a random sample of 234 U.S. companies which received VC financing 
after 1996, Hege et al. (2006) computed a mean IRR of 404% for IPO exits and 156% for Acquisition 
exits. In a comparative study of U.S. and Canadian VC exits Cumming and MacIntosh (2003) also 
found a significant difference between the gross average real return of IPOs (465%) and Acquisitions 
(143%) asserting that IPOs were the preferred means of exit for highly valued firms, market 
conditions permitting. Thus, one might expect that VC-backed firms endowed with greater 
technology resources are more likely to be associated with IPO than M&A exits. 
Hypothesis 1: Exit choice is associated with the innovation of technology-based firms.   
The technology regime in different industries can affect the extent of knowledge asymmetries 
between different types of owners and thus the mode of exit for venture capitalists. Makri et al. 
(2007) suggested that the degree of technological diversification and technological cumulativeness of 
 10 
 
an industry will have a positive effect on the likelihood that a venture capital firm will exit its 
technology investment via an M&A as opposed to an IPO. Thus, we shall verify whether tested 
hypotheses hold across sectors. 
There are few empirical studies which compared the timing characteristics of IPO and M&A exits.  
However, Giot and Schwienbacher (2007) provide an example of a thorough investigation of the 
dynamics of exit options for U.S. venture capital funds. Using a sample of 20,000 investment rounds, 
they applied survival analysis methods to study the time to ‘IPO’, ‘trade sale’ and ‘liquidation’ for 
6000 VC-backed firms. Exit times were modelled using competing risks models, allowing for a joint 
analysis of exit type and exit timing. The hazard rates for IPOs were found to be non-monotonic with 
respect to time. VC-backed firms first exhibit an increased likelihood of exiting to an IPO until they 
reach a plateau whereby non-exited investments have fewer possibilities of IPO exits as time 
increases. In contrast the hazard rate of trade sale exits was found to be less time-varying. As 
expected, significant variations in exit time were found across sectors (Huyghebaert et al., 2004).  
Building on agency and venture finance theory Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) developed a theory 
of going public. They postulated that firms have the choice between private equity financing and 
going public and argued that the optimal IPO timing decision was determined by the firm's trade-off 
between minimizing the duplication in information production by outsiders and avoiding the risk-
premium demanded by venture capitalists. However, IPOs tend to come in unexplained waves, and 
cluster in time. Exit conditions are a key performance driver in venture financing. The more serious 
problem caused by the absence of an active IPO market for venture-backed companies has been 
viewed as perhaps the single most important reason for the late development of venture financing 
outside the U.S. Moreover, it is well known that the venture capital industry has a high volatility 
which is associated with shifting valuations and activity in public equity markets. Gompers et al. 
(2008) examined how changes in public market signals affected venture capital investing between 
1975 and 1998 and concluded that venture capitalists with the most industry experience are best at 
adjusting investments to changes in public market signals (i.e. Tobin’s q6, IPO activity). Thus, in this 
study of venture capital exit performance it is important to control for temporal as well as sectoral 
effects. 
IPO and M&A Exit Performance 
Much has been written about the huge returns VCs can realise when a portfolio company goes public 
or is sold to a “motivated” strategic buyer. Successful exits are always well documented because they 
                                                 
6
 Tobin’s q is a ratio comparing the value of a firm given by financial markets with the value of a firm’s assets. 
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are required and expected to ensure the financial viability of investments in VC funds by limited 
partners (LPs). Individual VC exit multiples as well as the overall distribution of exit multiples are 
both critical to the success of VCs. One hugely successful exit will provide forgiveness for many 
portfolio company failures and, in the absence of such major success, a distribution of smaller 
successes may be acceptable to meet LPs’ expected rate of return. 
Metrick (2007) analysed state of the art panel data from the Sand Hill Econometrics (SHE) database 
and found that by ten years after the initial VC investment 23.2 percent of all companies had an IPO, 
38.0 percent had been acquired, 14.3 percent were defunct, and 24.6 percent were still private. 
However, Woodward and Hall (2003) investigated companies “still private” ten years after initial VC 
financing and research confirmed that these companies were more likely to have shut down worthless 
than other companies. Although 61% of all VC investments ended in an exit, all were not equally 
“successful”. Metrick found that 61.2 percent of all IPO exits yielded gross value multiples7 (i.e. 
GVM before fees and carry) in excess of five times the original investment (i.e. early-stage or 
expansion) and 5.3 percent yielded multiples in excess of 50 times. However, the multiples for 
acquisitions were much lower with 38.1 percent of all acquisitions resulting in a loss. Results are 
consistent with those from a 1980-1997 study by Das et al. (2003) who found exit multiples for 
acquired firms (average 7x for early-stage investments) to be significantly lower than exit multiples 
for IPOs (average 16x for early-stage investments) over the same stage of financing, time period and 
in similar industries. These returns appear impressive at first but correcting for exit selection bias of 
IPO of acquisition the arithmetic return of VC investments are reduced to 59% with an alpha of 32%. 
This is not significantly different from those of comparable small public stocks, implying that venture 
capital returns are correlated with market returns (Cochrane, 2005). 
The literature directly related to the research question of this paper is limited, sector-specific and has 
largely focused on the impact of innovation (proxy by patents) on VC financing and performance 
measures such as the occurrence of an IPO exit. Evidence of the influence of innovation on 
investment performance by venture capitalists is scarce. In a study of VC-backed semiconductor 
start-ups Hsu and Ziedonis (2007) found that a larger patent application stocks increased both the 
likelihood of achieving liquidity through an IPO. These findings are consistent with RBV and suggest 
that patents may be a strategic resource of that can provide competitive advantage and improve 
performance. Similarly, Mann and Sager (2007) linked and analysed data relating to venture capital 
financing of software start-up firms with data concerning the patents obtained by those firms and 
found significant and robust positive correlations between patenting and firm’s performance 
including total VC investment and exit status. Patenting practices varied very considerably amongst 
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sub-sectors of the software industry, suggesting the influence of sectoral factors.  
In this study, hypotheses are formulated to test whether total VC investment prior to exit, exit value 
and exit multiple are associated with innovation (proxy by patenting activity) of technology-based 
firms. The filing of patents may signal to prospective VC investors that the technology-based firm (i) 
has matured sufficiently to consider the commercial exploitation of its technological innovation and 
(ii) it is prepared to invest in the protection of its technological innovation. To strategic buyers and 
IPO investors it may signal that the technology-based firm (i) has accumulated unique technology 
resources, and (ii) develop a sustained competitive advantage in the marketplace. These technology 
resources, in turn, reduce the investment risk as perceived by VC investors, strategic buyers and IPO 
investors. Sectoral and temporal effects are examined whether they account for the uneven 
distribution of patenting activity and key determinants of venture capital investment performance. 
Total VC investment is defined as the cumulative sum of all venture capital round financings prior to 
exit. Exit value is defined as the deal size for M&A transactions and post-offer value for IPOs. Exit 
multiple is defined as the ratio of the value of the firm upon exit to the total VC investment. 
Hypotheses are as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Total VC investment is associated with the innovation of technology-based firms. 
Hypothesis 3: Exit value is associated with the innovation of technology-based firms. 
Hypothesis 4: Exit multiple is associated with the innovation of technology-based firms. 
4.  Data & Methodology 
The method of choice consists in the analysis of (private) cross-sectional archival data for U.S. VC-
backed technology M&A and IPO firms and related patent information spanning the 20 years from 
1980-2000. The period from 1980-2000 is particularly attractive as these were buoyant times (incl. 
four economic business cycles) for various innovative technologies such as networking, internet and 
biotechnology. Moreover the duration of the study period matches the patent term of 20 years from 
filing date which is the time protection generally granted from patents in the U.S.  
The sample includes 1504 VC-backed U.S. technology firms across seven different sectors, 961 
which exited via an IPO and 543 via M&A between 1980 and 2000. The focus on VC-backed 
technology exits means that this is a study of what successful technology firms and VC investors do. 
Data are issued from two distinct worlds for their ability to test hypotheses and draw inferences: the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
7
 Metrick defined ‘value multiple’ as the ratio of the value of the firm upon exit to the original Series A financing. 
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world of venture capital and the world of patents. Whilst both of these are well established research 
fields in their own right few bridges exist that provide a dependable path between them. One of the 
main challenges of this study was to build solid bridges between the world of venture capital and the 
world of patents.  
Patents as a measure of technological innovation 
Patents (a measure of technological innovation output) offer an important means of acquiring 
information about technological change in firms. They have advantages and disadvantages that 
complement other widely-used indicators such as R&D (a measure of technological innovation 
input), trade in high-technology products, etc. Innovation surveys can also be useful but do not lend 
themselves to comparisons at the country or firm level. In contrast patents are found increasingly 
used to monitor innovations occurring within the firm and chart the direction and content of current 
innovative activities carried out by technology firms (Archibugi et al., 1996). The value of a growing 
number of firms in knowledge intensive activities is determined by the value of its IP, thus the 
importance of patenting and the use of patent data as a good indicator of difference in inventive 
activity across firms (Griliches, 1990). Despite its weaknesses, critics of the use of patents have not 
been able to provide better measures. Numerous papers have been published which support the use of 
patent data as an output indicator of technological innovation in economic studies (Narin et al, 1987; 
Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999; Kortum and Lerner, 1999; Acs et al, 2002). In particular, “patents 
filed” has been shown to be a reliable leading indicator of technological innovation. 
Venture Data  
Venture data were sourced and compiled from Thomson VentureXpertTM throughout the VC 
investment cycle (from initial selection to exit) including total venture capital invested, M&A and 
IPO exit value and multiple prior to exit. VentureXpert dataset also provides detailed company 
information including sectoral data (major industry group, sectoral subgroup). VentureXpert is a 
proprietary database of Venture Economics, which is a division of Thomson Financial. Venture 
Economics receives quarterly reports on portfolio holdings from more than 1000 venture capital 
organizations and major institutional investors. The information includes several data points about the 
portfolio companies including, among other things, a designation of the type of investment, name and 
location of the portfolio firm, date and amount of investment and the industry in which the firm 
competes. Due to its richness and reliability, VentureXpert has been extensively used in venture 
capital research. It contains the official database for the U.S. National Venture Capital Association. 
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Patent Data  
Patent data were sourced from NBER-USPTO (Hall et al., 2001) supplemented by Thomson 
DelphionTM datasets to matched patent characteristics for VC-backed technology firms which exited 
via an IPO or M&A. The main NBER dataset extends from January 1, 1963 through December 30, 
1999 (37 years), and includes all the utility patents granted during that period, totaling 2,923,922 
patents; this dataset is referred as PAT63_99. In addition, the NBER CONAME file lists company 
names and associated assignee identifier. The patent data themselves were procured directly from the 
U.S. Patent Office. Where the firm names shown in VentureXpert and NBER were similar but not 
identical, judgements were based on city/state designations and technology area. 
VentureXpert-NBER Data Matching 
 
Technology venture company names from VentureXpert were matched with those of the NBER-
USPTO patent database. The search process relies heavily on the original USPTO’s coding of 
assignee names. Stata’s reclink facility was used to perform an automated match of VentureXpert and 
NBER-USPTO data by assignee name. This resulted in a matching yield of less than 50%. 
Remaining assignee names were matched through a time-consuming investigation based on multiple 
lines of evidence (e.g. location, time, sector code, patent code matching, etc). For each unmatched 
firm in the dataset, the Delphion database on issued U.S. patents and published applications was 
searched by hand using company name, location, sector code along with common abbreviations and 
variations in the spelling of companies’ names. “Weak” matches were verified by inspecting the 
inventor names, address information and the content of patent abstracts from Delphion. It is believed 
that this procedure captured all patent applications and issued patents for which a given firm was the 
assignee. But it is possible that some patents controlled by the firms in this sample were not captured 
in this search. Patent applications filed after the exit date were dropped from the resulting dataset. 
Data were uploaded in Stata 11, a full-featured statistical program for Windows, and all string and 
date variables were encoded prior to statistical treatment and analysis.  
Variables 
Several variables were used for this study but only a small subset was required to test hypotheses in 
this paper. They are as follows: 
1. Three dependent variables:  
a. investment:  Total (known) VC Amount Invested in million$ prior to exit 
b. value:   Exit Value in million$ 
c. multiple:  Exit Multiple (Ratio of Exit Value/Total VC Investment) 
 
2. One main independent variable:  
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a. p:  Dichotomous variable indicating patenting activity 
(0= no patenting; 1= patenting) 
b. patcount:  Variable indicating the total number of patents filed prior to exit 
   
3. Three control variables:  
a. sector:  Company Technology Sector (level-2 fixed effects) 
a. biotechnology  
b. communications  
c. computer hardware  
d. computer software  
e. internet  
f. medical/health  
g. semiconductor/electronics  
b. year:  Exit Year (1980 to 2000 for M&A or IPO) 
c. type:  Exit Type (0= M&A; 1= IPO) 
 
4. Other variables were primarily used to perform data matching and management operations. 
Figure 1 depicts model variables in relation to tested hypotheses. 
5. Results 
Summary Statistics 
The sample of 1504 VC-backed TBFs filed a total of 4261 patents prior to exiting over the study 
period. The sectoral distribution of venture capital exits and patents filed (prior to exit) over the study 
period is depicted in Table 1. Results show that IPO exits were found in all technology sectors over 
the study period with no sector representing less than 10% (i.e. computer hardware) or more than 
20% (i.e. computer software) of overall IPO exits. Sectoral patenting rates, however, varied more 
widely for firms which exited via an IPO ranging from a low of 3% (i.e. internet sector) to a high of 
28% (i.e. semiconductor/electronics sector) of total patents filed over the study period. In contrast, 
M&A exits were found to be relatively under-represented in some technology sectors (biotechnology: 
7%; internet and semiconductor/electronics: 8%) and largely over-represented in others (i.e. 
computer software: 32%). Similarly, sectoral patenting rates varied very widely for firms which 
exited via M&A with a low of 0.2% (i.e. internet sector) to a high of 36% (i.e. 
semiconductor/electronics sector) of total patents filed over the study period. 
An examination of the temporal distribution of venture capital exits and patents filed (prior to exit) in 
Table 2 reveals a gradual, albeit cyclical, increase in VC-backed technology IPOs, M&A and 
patenting activity over the study period. Total exits ranged from a low of 13 (1%) in 1982 to a high of 
284 (19%) in 1999, the last year of the study. Similarly, total number of filed patents ranged from 19 
(0.5%) in 1984 to a high of 742 (17%) in 1996. The absence of M&A exits prior to 1985 in our 
sample reflects the primary focus of Thomson’s VentureXpert on VC-backed IPOs at the time. 
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However, the total number of reported M&A exits in the last three years exceeded the number of 
reported IPO exits in spite of a buoyant financial market which peaked in March 2000 (“internet 
bubble”). 
Firms (543) which exited via M&A filed 1144 patents whilst firms (961) exited via an IPO filed 3117 
patents prior to exit. The average number of patents filed by firms which exited via an IPO (3.2) was 
50% higher than for firms which exited via M&A (2.1). This difference can be broken down in two 
components: patenting rate and patent count. The difference in sectoral patenting rates between exit 
routes is graphically depicted in Figure 2. Fifty two percent (52%) of firms which exited via an IPO 
were engaged in patenting whilst only 33% of firms which exited via M&A were. Except for the 
semiconductor/electronics sector, this difference in patenting rates appears to be persistent across all 
sectors. However sectoral patent count for firms engaged in patenting, depicted in Figure 3, does not 
seem to differ greatly between exit routes. The mean patent count of VC-backed which exited via an 
IPO or M&A stood at 6.3 patents filed per patenting firm. The p-values of two-sample t tests with 
unequal variances (Welch’s t tests) in Table 3 confirmed that, except for the semiconductor & 
electronics sector, the mean patenting rate of firms which exited via an IPO was significantly higher 
(at the 5% significance level or better) than for firms which exited via M&A. Thus, hypothesis 1 is 
accepted and we conclude that firms endowed with a technological resource (proxy by patenting) are 
more likely to be associated with the favoured and more profitable IPO exit route. However, the p-
values of two-sample t tests with equal variances in Table 4 show that once firms engaged in 
patenting activity they did not significantly differ in patent count, implying comparable innovation 
intensity of patenting firms exiting via an IPO or M&A. More sophisticated regression models are 
required to test what relationships hold true between technological innovation and venture capital exit 
performance when controlling for sectoral and temporal effects as well as exit route. 
Regression Analysis 
The dataset contains 1504 observations in total. Because the 1504 observations represent several 
sectors however the usual assumptions of OLS and other common statistical methods do not apply. 
Instead models with more complex error specifications are required, allowing for both unit-specific 
and individual-observation disturbances.   
The i.i.d. (independent and identically distributed) errors assumption is unlikely for panel data where 
the observations consist of the same units measured repeatedly. A more plausible panel-data model 
included two error terms. One is common to each of the i units, but differs between units (ui). The 
second is unique to each of the i, j observations (eij). Units are defined as sectors and sectoral panels 
are treated with total VC investment, exit value and exit multiple as dependent variable yij and 
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patenting and patent count as independent variables patentingtij and patcountij together with the two 
variables yearij to typeij to control for exit year and exit route, respectively. 
yij = β0 + β1patentingij + β2patcountij + β3yearij + β4typeij + ui + eij  
 
i level-2 units 
j level-1nested observations 
 
In short, panel data are a blessing as they provide more informative data, more variability (e.g. 
sectoral effects), with less collinearity among variables, more degree of freedom and more efficiency. 
The model however is specified in “reduced form” because data on endogenous variables such as the 
amount of total non-VC capital received per unit of patented innovation for the financed technology-
based firms was not available.  
A two-level regression model accounting for the potential sectoral factors of innovation was fitted. It 
is a two-level fixed-effects (within) regression model on seven sectoral data panels, with year and 
type control variables (and robust Huber-White sandwich variance estimator8). 
Results from the multilevel regression model are summarised in Table 5. However, before analyzing 
results and drawing hasty conclusions, the assumptions of the multilevel linear models must first be 
tested to ensure that they are not violated. As in multiple regression analysis, residual plots can be 
used to test model assumptions. The assumptions that need be examined in the multilevel linear 
models for VC investment, exit value and exit multiple are the assumptions of normality, linearity, 
homoscedasticity and multicollinearity.  
Normality 
Because the variances of the residual estimates depend on the value of the fixed coefficients, it is 
common to ‘standardise’ the residuals by the appropriate standard errors. A standardised normality 
plot can then be used to check the normality assumption of firm-level (i.e. level-one eij) residuals. 
The standardised residuals are plotted against a theoretical normal distribution in such a way that the 
points should form a straight line. Results, plotted at the top of Figure 4, indicate that the log 
transformations of response variables under investigation display an approximate normal distribution 
of residuals.  
                                                 
8
 The Huber-White sandwich variance estimator is a robust variance estimate that adjusts for within-cluster correlation. Robust 
variances give accurate assessments of the sample-to-sample variability of the parameter estimates even when the model is 
misspecified. Huber-White standard errors, or heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, were used to allow the fitting of models 
containing heteroskedastic residuals. 
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Linearity and Homoscedasticity 
The assumption of linearity and homoscedasticity (i.e. constant finite variance) can be examined by 
applying a residual plot against predicted value of the response variable and using the fixed part of 
the multilevel regression for the prediction. The residual plots at the bottom of Figure 4 show the 
scatter of residuals around the predicted line. The plotted residual values of all response variables 
confirm the assumptions of linearity and homoscedasticity as residuals are evenly distributed around 
the predicted line and show no significant patterns indicating the presence of non-constant variances. 
Moreover, Huber-White standard errors, or heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, are used to 
allow the fitting of the fixed-effects models that may contain heteroscedastic residuals between 
sectoral panels (ui). 
Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity exists when two or more independent variables in a multiple regression model are 
highly correlated. This may result in the fixed-effects coefficient estimates iβˆ  to change erratically in 
response to small changes in the model or the data. Although multicollinearity does not reduce the 
predictive power or reliability of the model as a whole, it affects calculations regarding individual 
predictors. Fortunately, the variance inflation factor (VIF) helps detect the presence of 
multicollinearity. The VIF factor for iβˆ  with the following formula: 
 
Where R2i  is the coefficient of determination of the regression equation. The magnitude of 
multicollinearity is determined by considering the size of the VIF( iβˆ ). A common rule of thumb is 
that if VIF( iβˆ ) > 5 then multicollinearity is high. Table 5 shows that the mean VIF for the multilevel 
models was 1.15 with no VIF( iβˆ ) exceeding 1.25 (i.e. β1 for patenting).  This means that the 
standard error is 12% larger (i.e. √VIF( iβˆ )) than it would be if the patenting variable was 
uncorrelated with other independent variables in the equation. Thus, we conclude that 
multicollinearity is negligible. All key conditions of the multilevel linear regression model are met. 
Results in Table 5 show that multilevel fixed-effects regression models for VC investment, exit value 
and exit multiple are all  significant at the 1% significance level (Pr>F= .000). In particular, models 
for VC investment and exit value provide a very good fit (i.e. overall R2), explaining 18% and 29% of 
the total variance. The positive VC investment regression’s coefficients β1 for patenting and β2 for 
patent count (significant at the 10% significance level) means that total VC investment received by 
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technology firms is positively influenced by patenting and patenting intensity prior to exit, after 
controlling for exit route, sectoral and temporal effects. The positive exit value regression’s 
coefficient β2 for patent count (significant at the 1% significance level) means that the exit value of 
technology firms is positively influenced by patenting intensity, after controlling for exit route, 
sectoral and temporal effects. Hypotheses H2 and H3 are accepted. However, the negative exit 
multiple regression’s coefficient β1 for patenting (significant at the 10% significance level) means 
that the exit multiple of technology firms is negatively influenced by patenting, after controlling for 
exit route, sectoral and temporal effects. Thus, hypothesis H4 is rejected. As expected, exit route is an 
important and significant (at the 1% significance level) control variable for all determinants of 
venture capital exit performance under investigation: total VC investment, exit value and exit 
multiple. Exit year is also an important and significant (at the 1% significance level) control variable 
for VC investment and exit value but not exit multiple which has been relatively constant over the 
study period. Figure 5 illustrates how fitted VC investment and exit value have risen steadily from 
1980-2000 for TBFs which exited via an IPO or M&A. Finally, the intraclass correlation ρ  indicates 
that strong sectoral fixed effects ui contributes to explain large fractions of the variance, especially in 
the exit value multilevel regression model where sectoral fixed effects explained nearly 11% of the 
total variance. 
6. Discussion and Conclusion  
The paper contributes to two important strands of the literature. First it expands the literature on 
venture capital by showing that technology firms, characterised by higher innovation intensity, are 
rewarded with larger investment from VC investors and superior exit value. However, innovation 
failed to positively influence the exit multiple of VC-backed technology firms. Whilst average VC 
investment and exit value have increased steadily over time, exit time has been remarkably stable. 
Previous research has shown that technological innovation (proxy by patents) can act as an important 
quality signal which reduces the risk of adverse selection and attracts more VC investors and larger 
investment (Nadeau, 2010).  However, the balance between investment, risk and return is a delicate 
one. The paper provides some evidence that VCs may be over-investing in innovative TBFs. This, in 
turn, can result in lower performance as higher exit values fail to keep up with higher VC investments 
in innovative TBFs. Other studies have highlighted the relationship between patenting activity and 
the firm’s performance, including number of rounds and total VC investment (Mann and Sager, 
2007) in the software sector and the likelihood of attracting a prominent VC investor in the 
semiconductor sector (Hsu and Ziedonis, 2007). This paper, however, provides a novel contribution 
to venture capital research by establishing clear linkages between the technological innovation and 
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exit performance of VC-backed technology firms across several technology sectors between 1980 
and 2000 and throughout the whole venture capital cycle, from initial investment to exit.  
As a contribution to the RBV literature the study findings reveal that unique (i.e. VRIS-compliant) 
technology resources, protected by patents, attract more VC investment and are associated with 
higher exit values. The favoured and more profitable IPO exit route was found to be associated with 
firms with technology resources. However, RBV did not explain why innovative firms endowed with 
unique technology failed to deliver competitive advantage and produce higher exit multiples and 
thus, adequately reward VC investors.  The study highlights limitations of the RBV when applied to 
fast-changing entrepreneurial technology firms.  
These results have important implications for entrepreneurial firms and venture capital practice. As a 
large-scale study of the patented innovations of technology firms that successfully managed to exit 
via an IPO or M&A results inform us of the good practices and dangers of innovation.  
Results suggest that technology-based firms can benefit from innovation. The study findings show 
that innovation can improve firm’s ability to attract larger VC investment which can be use to 
accelerate commercialisation, build a market advantage and distance competitors. Patents, by their 
very nature, provide owners with the right to exclude others from making, using, selling the patented 
invention for the term of the patent which is usually 20 years from the filing date. They buy time for 
the entrepreneurial venture to build the business and mitigate the risk of being outspent by well-
resourced incumbents in the short term. Patented innovations are intangible assets which increase 
company valuation.  They are associated with higher exit value and contribute to increasing 
shareholders’ wealth. 
Venture capital firms should consider patented innovation as an important and significant quality 
signal which can help with investment activities and contribute to value creation. Technology firms 
with patented innovations and more likely to exit via an IPO, a highly desirable and profitable 
outcome expected from limited partners investing in VC funds. Previous studies have shown that 
bringing companies public can influence fundraising and can indeed be a matter of survival for VC 
firms (Gompers et al., 1996). TBFs with patented innovations are associated with higher exit value, 
irrespective of exit route. However, results also show that TBFs engaged in patenting activity are also 
associated with lower exit multiple, a stark reminder to VCs that they must exert caution and keep 
investment in innovative TBFs in balance with expected return. 
This study, however, has several limitations and further work is required. First, whilst this research 
focuses on patented inventions many technological innovations are not patented. New research 
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methods are needed to collect reliable data on different types of innovation relevant to young 
technology firms. The net benefits of alternative measures of technological innovation at different 
stages in the venture capital cycle represent an understudied yet promising avenue for further study. 
Second, all patents are not created equal. Patent characteristics such as quality or importance need be 
studied in detail to enable a better understanding of the influence of patenting activity on venture 
capital investment performance. Third, the study focused on the analysis of time-invariant variables 
and, other than exit time, temporal aspects of patented innovation were neglected.  Static RBV 
approaches have been criticised for relegating causality to a “black-box”, calling for a more rigorous 
RBV answering causal “how” questions, and incorporating the temporal component (Priem and 
Butler, 2001). These temporal effects may be nested within regions and sectors, implying that more 
sophisticated controls for collinearity and endogeneity may require more advanced multilevel (3-
level) mixed-effects modelling techniques. The mixed results obtained in this study suggest that a 
dynamic RBV of the technology-based firm is in order. Many unanswered questions need to be 
explored in future work. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1:  Model Variables 
sector
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Note: Constructed variables are shown in italics.
 
Figure 2:  Pre-Exit Patenting Rates 
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Figure 3:  Pre-Exit Patent Count  
 
Figure 4:  Multilevel Linear Regression Assumptions 
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Figure 5: Fitted VC Investment and Exit Value by Exit Route 
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Table 1:  Sectoral Distribution of Venture Capital Exits and Filed Patents (prior to exit) 
 
TECHNOLOGY SECTOR M&A EXITS PATENT FILED IPO EXITS PATENT FILED TOTAL EXITS TOTAL PATENTS 
FILED 
Biotechnology 38 110 117 600 155 710 
Communications 102 123 122 293 224 416 
Computer Hardware 63 133 93 305 156 438 
Computer Software 176 98 192 136 368 234 
Internet Specific 42 3 124 99 166 102 
Medical/Health 79 268 186 806 265 1074 
Semiconductor/Electr 43 409 127 878 170 1287 
TOTAL 543 1144 961 3117 1504 4261 
 
 
Table 2:  Temporal Distribution of Venture Capital Exits and Filed Patents (prior to exit)  
 
EXIT YEAR M&A EXITS PATENT FILED IPO EXITS PATENT FILED TOTAL EXITS TOTAL PATENTS 
FILED 
1980 0 0 14 30 14 30 
1981 0 0 16 23 16 23 
1982 0 0 13 29 13 29 
1983 0 0 45 103 45 103 
1984 0 0 17 19 17 19 
1985 2 156 13 3 15 159 
1986 0 0 36 97 36 97 
1987 3 3 28 59 31 62 
1988 1 0 15 42 16 42 
1989 3 10 23 72 26 82 
1990 4 1 24 75 28 76 
1991 2 4 58 163 60 167 
1992 36 102 57 129 93 231 
1993 33 78 69 369 102 447 
1994 46 105 52 98 98 203 
1995 50 61 76 404 126 465 
1996 57 105 129 637 186 742 
1997 84 150 66 315 150 465 
1998 99 192 49 129 148 321 
1999 123 177 161 321 284 498 
TOTAL 543 1144 961 3117 1504 4261 
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Table 3:  Difference in Patenting Rates between VC Exit Routes  
 
  M&A Exits   IPO Exits  Diff. Means 
 Number of 
Observations 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Number of 
Observations 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
p-value 
Pr(IPO>M&A) 
Biotechnology 38 0.50 0.51 117 0.71 0.46 0.017 
Communications 102 0.31 0.46 122 0.51 0.50 0.000 
Computer Hardware 63 0.40 0.49 93 0.62 0.49 0.003 
Computer Software 176 0.23 0.42 192 0.32 0.47 0.027 
Internet Specific 42 0.07 0.26 124 0.24 0.43 0.001 
Medical/Health 79 0.35 0.48 186 0.58 0.49 0.000 
Semiconductor/Electr 43 0.79 0.41 127 0.75 0.44 0.282 
TOTAL 543 0.33 0.47 961 0.52 0.50 0.000 
 
 
Table 4:  Difference in Patent Count between VC Exit Routes (for patenting firms) 
 
  M&A Exits   IPO Exits  Diff. Means 
 Number of 
Observations 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Number of 
Observations 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
p-value 
Pr(IPO>M&A) 
Biotechnology 19 5.79 5.02 82 7.32 10.23 0.264 
Communications 31 3.97 4.55 62 4.73 11.00 0.357 
Computer Hardware 25 5.32 9.94 58 5.26 9.52 0.511 
Computer Software 41 2.39 2.42 62 2.19 3.02 0.636 
Internet Specific 3 1.00 0.00 30 3.30 3.61 0.143 
Medical/Health 28 9.57 9.53 108 7.46 9.49 0.852 
Semiconductor/Electr 34 12.03 23.43 95 9.24 10.85 0.820 
TOTAL 181 6.32 12.1 497 6.27 9.56 0.522 
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Table 5:  Multilevel Regression Results 
 
Sectoral Venture Capital     Exit Performance 
Data Panels Multilevel Fixed-effects (within) Regression (robust) 
 Log VC Investment Log Exit Value Log Exit Multiple 
    
R-sq within 0.1535                        0.2661                         0.0613                         
R-sq between 0.7280                                       0.6308                                        0.0829                                        
R-sq overall 0.1818                                   0.2917                                        0.0544                                        
    
    
Mean VIF 1.15 1.15 1.15 
    
    
Prob > F 0.0005*** 0.0000*** 0.0002*** 
    
    
Patenting  (β1 coefficient, VIF=1.25) 0.1492*    - -0.1575* 
    
Patent count (β2 coefficient,VIF=1.22) 0.0168*    0.0133*** - 
    
    
Exit year (β3 coefficient, VIF=1.13) 0.1094***    0.0977*** - 
    
Exit type (β4 coefficient, VIF=1.15) 0.6758***  1.3455***    0.6567***    
    
    
σu  (fixed effects) 0.2462 0.3666 0.2584 
σe  (standard errors) 1.2102 1.0683 1.3000 
ρ  (intraclass correlation1) 0.0397   0.1053    0.0380    
    
*** 1% significance level, ** 5% significance level, *10% significance level 
1
 ICC is the fraction of variance due to sectoral fixed effects (ui). 
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